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COMPULSORY TRADEMARK LICENSURE AS A
REMEDY FOR MONOPOLIZATION
A trademark, under present American law, confers upon its holder the
exclusive right to identify goods with a mark, although it does not bar others
from marketing like goods under a different trademark.' The exclusive use
of a trademark, although not in itself an antitrust violation, 2 may be the
source of considerable economic power which can operate to the detriment
of a competitive marketplace.3 For this reason, the courts have long recog4
nized that trademarks can be used, or misused, to violate the antitrust laws.
While the courts have condemned the use of trademarks to violate the antitrust laws, they have not yet directed that antitrust violators make their
trademarks available to competitors. Although compulsory patent licenses
are an accepted remedy for similar antitrust violations, 5 the issue of compulsory trademark licensing has not to date been vigorously litigated. Some
courts which have commented on the possibility have been hesitant to impose
what they perceive as a drastic remedy. 6
In August 1976, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Administrative Law
Judge (AU) took the unprecedented step of ordering compulsory trademark
1. This article will be concerned exclusively with trademarks, which are used to
identify products, and will not discuss trade names, which are used to identify companies
and corporations. See, e.g., E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PRIMER 226 (1975).

The use of trademarks to identify makers or sources of goods dates from antiquity,
and for a time trademarks were employed as a significant means of maintaining
monopoly power. However, with the dissolution of medieval guilds and the prohibition

of manufacturing monopolies, the concept of trademark protection became divorced from
the protection of monopolies. See Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975). See also Behrendt, Trademarks and Monopolies-Historicaland Conceptual Foundations,51

TRADEMARK REP.

853, 853-59 (1961).

2. See, e.g., McCormack v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 158 (D. Minn.
1968).
3. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
5. Compulsory licensure as an antitrust remedy compels holders of intellectual property to license it to competitors. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S.
319 (1947).
6. E.g., Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 851 (1962).
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licensure as relief in a monopolization case. In Borden, Inc.,7 ALJ Daniel
H. Hanscom found that Borden, the maker of ReaLemon Lemon Juice, had
violated section 5 of the FTC Act by actively maintaining a monopoly of processed lemon juice. The ReaLemon brand, virtually a generic term for
processed lemon juice, held approximately 90% of the processed lemon juice
market and commanded premium prices of 25 to 30 cents per unit over competitive products. The AU concluded that the dominance of the ReaLemon
brand and its public acceptance were a source of monopoly power and that
Borden had illegally used discriminatory area pricing and promotions to
maintain that monopoly. 8 He held that the only effective relief would be
compulsory licensing of the "ReaLemon" brand name and ordered that Borden license the mark to competitors, at a royalty of not more than one-half
of one percent of dollar sales, for a period of 10 years.
The FTC staff has also recommended compulsory trademark licensing in a
case against the major cereal manufacturers. 9 The complaint in that action
alleges that the respondents, whose sales accounted for 90% of all readyto-eat cereal sales in 1970, have over a 30-year period engaged in activities
which have resulted in an extremely concentrated, noncompetitive ready-toeat cereal market.' 0 FTC complaint counsel contend that the respondents'
proliferation of essentially similar cereal brands and use of trademarks to accentuate insignificant differences between brands have been instrumental in
maintaining a noncompetitive market structure and have prevented smaller
concerns from making inroads into the market. The Commission attorneys
argue that compulsory licensing of existing and future cereal trademarks on
a royalty-free basis for a specified time period is essential to restoration of
competition in that market."
The issues raised in the cereal case are
presently being litigated, and a decision has not been issued on the legality
of the cereal companies' actions or the necessity for compulsory licensing.
The ReaLemon case and the cereal complaint represent a major breakthrough in antitrust remedies. This article will examine the interplay between trademark and antitrust laws and the implications of compulsory
trademark licensure for both.
I. TRADEMARKS, ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS, AND REMEDIES
The definition of a trademark indicates one of its primary functions in the
7. No. 8978 (F.T.C., Aug. 19, 1976).

8. Id. at 98.
9. Named as respondents are Kellogg, General Mills, General Foods, and Quaker
Oats. Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (F.T.C., May 4, 1971).
10. Id.

11. See Complaint Counsel's Trial Brief, Volume II, Legal Contentions and Case
Authorities, Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (F.T.C., filed Feb. 17, 1976).
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marketplace, the identification of the goods of a particular manufacturer or
merchant. 1 2 The Lanham Act of 194613 defines a trademark as "any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from
those manufactured or sold by others."' 4 The exclusive right to a particular
trademark vests in the first party to use it to identify goods or merchandise
of a particular business.' 5 Sole use of a mark may be secured by registration
under the Lanham Act, although the recognition of marks which have not
been registered under the federal statute is often permitted under state law. 16
Although the identification function of trademarks remains the legal basis
for their protection, that particular role may be of diminishing significance
in the modern marketplace where the consumer often does not know or care
who manufactures a particular product. 17 At the same time two practical
functions of trademarks have assumed increasing importance. They act as
a guarantee to the consumer that the product purchased today will be identical to a previously purchased product bearing the same mark. They also
serve to advertise a product; when a symbol is known to the public, the
package bearing the trademark itself becomes an advertisement. In that
sense, the trademark has been said to "'reach over the shoulder of the
retailer' and across the latter's counter straight to the consumer.' 8 This
selling power often depends as much on the public acceptance of the trademark as upon the merit of the goods to which it is affixed, and, as a result
of these advertising and guarantee functions, trademarks often become significant competitive weapons. 19
When a trademark has become so familiar that it assumes the status of
a generic term, the exclusive right to its use may be lost.20 A word will be
12. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970). The Act began federal trademark registration
and provided for access to the federal courts in trademark cases. Id. §§ 1051, 1071.
14. Id. § 1127.
15. See, e.g., Rolley, Inc. v. Younghusband, 204 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1953).
16. See 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLY § 76.1, at 274 (3d ed. 1967).
17. See Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1931); Schechter,
supra note 12, at 814.
18. Schechter, supra note 12, at 818, citing to I H. WELLS, THE WORLD OF WILLIAM
CLISSOLD 238 (1926). See also, Diamond, supra note 1, at 289-90; 3 R. CALLMANN,
supra note 16, § 65.3, at 12; Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d
774 (7th Cir. 1927).
19. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942); 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 16, § 65, at 3.
20. See generally, Zivin, Understanding Generic Words, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 173
(1973).
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considered generic if, in the public understanding, it refers to a particular
type of product rather than to a particular brand or source of manufacture. 21
Aspirin, 22 brassiere, 23 cola, 24 thermos,2 5 and yo-yo 26 are among the words
which began as trademarks, but are now in the public domain. In determining whether a term has become generic, the courts look to its principal significance, 27 and the trademark owner will be deprived of his exclusive rights
only when there is conclusive evidence of the changed character of the
mark. 28 When the word is found to have become generic in meaning, the
trademark holder is deprived of his sole right to use the term to describe his
product because the term now effectively describes not only his product, but
29
an entire genus of products.
A trademark which has not become generic may be considered a monopoly
in the limited sense that it confers upon the owner the exclusive right to
manufacture and sell goods bearing that trademark.3 0 However, in contrast
to the rights attached to patents and copyrights, the exclusive use of a trademark does not prevent a competitor from marketing like goods under a different name. 3 ' Since the only exclusive right is the use of a particular mark,
21. See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heraeous Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457
(3d Cir. 1968); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 306 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.
1962); Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1952); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). A trademark owner may attempt to protect his trademark by objecting to its inclusion in dictionaries and to its use in books, articles, and
public documents.
22. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
23. See Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 114, 60 A. 407
(1905).
24. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages Inc., 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947);
Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941).
25. See American Thermos Products Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D.
Conn. 1962), af 'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 19,63).
26. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1965).
27. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). The issue
of when a trademark becomes a generic word often arises as a defense in infringement
actions.
28. See, e.g., Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205
(N.D. Ga. 1967).
29. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.1, at 406
(1973).
30. Cf. 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 16, § 15.5, at 460.
31. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600, 603-04
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 703 (1921); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena,
298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), ajf'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
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trademark protection, in theory, is not at odds with antitrust policy,32 and,
in fact, it promotes competition by allowing consumers to make an informed
choice among a variety of competitive articles. It protects the consumer's
33
interest in knowing that he is purchasing the product that he wants.
Although the monopoly over a particular trademark is limited, it may
nevertheless yield its owner considerable economic power.3 4 Because of the

trademark's role in creating consumer demand for a product, its effect of fostering dominant positions in the market is increasing. 5 By differentiating
his product from that of his competitors, and thus persuading the consumer
that no other product is as good, a manufacturer can "create a partial immunity from the chills and fevers of competition. ' '3 6 When a seller is able,
through product differentiation, to create a consumer preference for his product, he may be able to raise prices without jeopardizing his position in the
market.3 7 Similarly, the difficulty of enticing the consumer away from a suc32. See generally Lunsford, Trademarks and the Antitrust Law Complete Compatibility-No Divorce Needed, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 463 (1975); Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADEMARK REP.
613 (1950); Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV.
967 (1952).
33. See Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 3,63 F.2d 945, 954 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F.2d 891,
893 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 705 (1925); Pattishall, supra note 32, at 971; Timberg, Trademarks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 323, 325 (1949).
Contra, Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d
955, 9,57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943).
This was the stance taken by the authors of the Lanham Act. See S. REP. No. 1333,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946):
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish
one from the other. Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence
creates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit,
to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who
have created them to those who have not ...
34. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972) (trademark can be "tying" item for tying arrangement violation
in restraint of trade).
35. See Hatab, The Trademark and Its Function in the Control of Commercializa-

tion, 65
36.

TRADEMARK REP. 83

(1975).

Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,

57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183 (1948). See also J. BAIN, INDUSnRIAL
(2d ed. 1968); E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIS'C

ORGANIZATION
COMPETTON

223-50
(1946);

Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called 'Product Differentiation',
2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 59 (Summer 1969); Papandreou, The Economic Effect of
Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 503 (1956). But see Oppenheim, supra note 32.
37. See Comment, Abuse of Trademarks: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing, 7
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cessfully differentiated brand may deter the entry of new competition into
the market.3 8 Thus through successful brand differentiation the seller attains
monopoly power; 39 that is, the power to control prices and exclude competi40
tion.
Despite these significant advantages, the exclusive use of trademarks, and
even their aggressive and extensive use, does not itself violate the antitrust
laws. 41 Monopolization charges based on a defendant's aggressive use of
trademarks, such as registration of many different marks, massive advertising,
and infringement suits on mere "colorable similarity", have failed. 42 The
courts have, however, long condemned the use of trademarks in furtherance
of schemes that do violate the antitrust laws. In Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States,43 the Supreme Court held that restraints of trade could
not be justified on the ground that they were part of a valid trademark
licensing program. 44 In Timken, a United States roller bearing manufacturer was charged with conspiring with a British and a French manufacturer to allocate territorial markets among the three manufacturers.
Timken defended on the ground that the territorial restraints were only incidental to the trademark contracts. The Court concluded that this contention was refuted by the district court's finding that the trademark provisions
of the agreements were subsidiary and secondary to the purpose of allocating
markets. It emphasized that the agreements went beyond the protection of
the use of the trade name, Timken, and provided for the control of the manufacture and sale of ball bearings whether displaying the trademark or not.
The Court concluded that "[a] trademark cannot be legally used as a device
for Sherman Act violation. ' 45 Timken stands for the proposition that the use
U. MICH. J. OF L. REF. 644, 646 (1974).
38. See J. BAIN, supra note 36, at 255-60; Papandreou, supra note 36, at 509.
39. See Timberg, supra note 33, at 325-29.
40. E.g., United States v. E.I. duPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 811 (1946). Product differentiation is not limited to competitors. Distinctions are
often created between virtually identical goods produced by the same firm. Hatab,
supra note 35, at 83.
41. McCormack v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 158 (D. Minn. 1968)
(complaint alleging conspiracy to monopolize, monopolization or attempted monopolization of defendants trademarked product failed to state a cause of action); Merrimac
Hat Corp. v. Crown Overall Mfg. Co., 91 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), a/I'd per curiam, 186F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1951).
42. See, e.g., Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 326 F.2d 87, 96 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964).
43. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
44. Id. at 598-99.

45. Id. at 599.
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of trademarks as instruments, or as reinforcing and peripheral elements, of
contracts or combinations in restraint of trade will be condemned as violative
of the antitrust laws.

46

Although it is well established that trademarks may be vehicles for anticompetitive conduct, loss of the exclusive right to use a trademark has not
been a generally accepted remedy for antitrust violations. Nonetheless, forfeiture of trademark rights because of antitrust misconduct has been discussed
in three contexts: consent decrees ordering dedication or injunction of enforcement of trademarks, judgments imposing limitations on trademark rights
short of compulsory licensure or dedication, and the assertion of antitrust
violations as an affirmative defense in trademark infringement actions.
Dedication and injunction of enforcement of trademarks have been
ordered in consent decrees in cases brought by the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division. 47 Dedication, in contrast to compulsory licensure,
is formal transfer of the trademark to the public domain by notification
of the appropriate governmental agency. It usually results in forfeiture
of the trademark without compensation, whereas compulsory licensure may
be royalty-free, or at a rate specified in the final decree, or at a reasonable
royalty. Injunction of enforcement does not require transfer to the public
domain, but has an effect similar to dedication in that it does not include a

46. See, e.g., 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 29, § 31.23, at 415; Behrendt, supra note
1, at 862; Timberg, supra note 33, at 324. See also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596 (1972) (territorial restrictions in trademark license granted by supermarket cooperatives illegal per se as horizontal division of markets among competitors); United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (per se illegal for seller of trademarked goods to impose territorial or customer restrictions on purchasing distributors);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (trademark license agreements restricting each licensee to manufacture and sale in designated area per se illegal); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972)
(trademark can be a "tying" item for tying arrangement violation in restraint of trade);
United States v. Lever Bros., Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (acquisition of
trademarks may be a violation of anti-merger laws).
62,233 (N.D. Ohio
47. In United States v. A.B. Dick Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas.
1948), in which the Department of Justice charged A.B. Dick and others with conspiring
to restrain trade in duplicating equipment and with monopolization of the duplication
equipment industry, the consent decree included the requirement that A.B. Dick dedicate
its trademark "Mimeograph" to the public without compensation both in the United
States and abroad. Similarly, in United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade
Cas. 67,828 (D.R.I. 1954), manufacturers and distributors charged with market allocation, price fixing, and exclusive dealing agreed in a consent decree to dedicate three
registered trademarks and to forego filing suits based upon the three trademarks. In
United States v. Gamewell Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas. 1 62,236 (D. Mass. 1948), the defendant was enjoined in a consent decree from enforcing its trademark, but was not
required to transfer them to the public domain.
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mechanism for compensation of the trademark holder for its use by others. 48
A trademark-related remedy short of compulsory licensure was ordered in
United States v. General Electric Co.4 9 To remedy General Electric's
monopolization of electric lamps, the district court ordered, among other
things, that General Electric limit the use of its mark to one percent of its
sales of certain products in any year, 50 but the court did not require that
others be permitted to use the General Electric trademarks. Judicial reluctance to tamper further with trademark rights was voiced in Switzer Brothers,
Inc. v. Locklin,5 1 in which the court characterized divestiture of rights in a
trademark as a drastic remedy which should be applied with caution. 52 This
case was a patent infringement suit brought by the manufacturer of "Dayglo" paint, in which the defendant counterclaimed that the "Day-glo" trademark had acquired an artificial value as a result of the owner's unlawful conduct. The court refused to order the requested remedy of an injunction
against future use of the trademark, but hinted that broader remedial powers
might be used in a government suit.53 Significantly, the relief requested in
Switzer involved complete non-use of the mark rather than compulsory licensure with compensation.
In trademark infringement cases, proof that the trademark upon which the
plaintiff is bringing suit was a significant part of activity which violated the
antitrust laws may result in nonenforceability of the trademark5 4 and a decree
cancelling the registration of the mark. 55 Antitrust misconduct which is
merely collateral to the plaintiff's trademark will not result in denial of trade48. For a discussion of the controversy over whether reasonable royalty licensing is
preferable to forfeiture without compensation, see REPORT OF

THE

ATTORNEY

GENER-

AL'S NAT'L COMM'N TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 255-62 (1959).

49. 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953), modifying 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
50. Id. at 858.
51. 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962).
52. Id. at 48.
53. Id. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (divestiture of
acquired assets including trade name ordered in merger case).
54. See Phi Delta Theta Frat. v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo.
1966) (enforcement of trademarks denied where several fraternities registered trademarks
in order to eliminate competition). Cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 298
F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a/I'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 905 (1971) (proof that trademark was valuable asset and that trademarks were

affixed to goods which were subject of anti-competitive activity not sufficient to render
trademarks unenforceable); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Marshall-Wells Co., 1959 Trade Cas.

69,343 (N.D. Il1. 1959) (full factual determination necessary before determination
that alleged illegal trade practices related to trademark); Sanitized, Inc. v. S.C. Johnson
& Sons, 23 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (sufficiency of defense to infringement action
based upon plaintiff's alleged use of trademark to violate antitrust laws would be determined at trial).
55. See Phi Delta Theta Frat. v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo.
1966).
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mark enforcement.," The defendant must show that the trademark is the
"basic and fundamental vehicle required and used to accomplish the violation."'57 This is the one limited circumstance in which courts have acted
to deprive a trademark owner of his rights.
In contrast with trademark law, compulsory licensure is an accepted
remedy for antitrust violations involving patents.58 Use of this remedy has
been deemed an appropriate means of restoring competition to markets in
which competition has been foreclosed by illegal restraints.5 9 Compulsory
patent licensing makes technology previously exclusively used by the patentee
available to competitors and potential competitors so that they may effectively compete with the antitrust violator in the sale of the patented products.
In this way, the potentially long lasting effects of prior restraints of trade may
be negated. Compulsory patent licenses enable competitors to make inroads
on the antitrust violator's illegal hold on the market.
Although in certain circumstances compulsory trademark licensure may be
an equally effective means of restoring competition to a noncompetitive
market, the difference in the nature of the monopolies involving patents
from those involving trademarks suggests that trademark licensing might be
appropriate in fewer situations than patent licensing. Whereas a patent confers upon its owner the exclusive use of the patented technology, which in
some cases is the key to an entire industry, a trademark does not foreclose
others from selling similar, or even identical, products. 60 Thus the formidable
56. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), a/I'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971) (trademark
not "competent producing cause" of alleged antitrust violations); Forstmann Woolen Co.
v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (defense which failed to allege
that trademark was integral part of antitrust violation insufficient).
57. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 298 F. Supp. at 1315.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (compulsory
patent licensure appropriate remedy for patent pool covenant restricting bulk sales and

resales); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950) (defendants
who had fixed prices were ordered to license patents at a reasonable royalty); United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (defendants who had used patent licenses to allocate markets ordered to grant to any applicant nonexclusive license of

certain patents at uniform reasonable royalty); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386 (1945) (defendants who monopolized trade by acquisition of patents and
exclusion of competition could properly be required to grant alleged patent infringers
nondiscriminatory and nonrestrictive licenses at standard royalties); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afI'd per curiam, 347 U.S.

521 (1954) (defendant guilty of monopolizing shoemaking machinery ordered to license
patents on a reasonable royalty basis).
It is within the FTC's power to order compulsory patent licensing. Charles Pfizer
& Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 585-86 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
59. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).

60. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 298 F. Supp. at 1314; Stedman,
Patent and Trade-mark Relief in Antitrust Judgments, 10 FED. B.J. 260, 269-70 (1949).
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power inherent in a patent should be subject to some checks that may be
inappropriate or overly severe in the trademark area. Nevertheless, there
are cogent arguments that compulsory licensing is appropriate in trademarkantitrust cases. Trademarks are creatures of the common law, now reinforced
by statute, in contrast to patent rights which are derived from a constitutional
guarantee. Moreover, trademarks have proven to be potent anticompetitive
weapons not subject to the patent's 17-year time limit. Despite these arguments, prior to Borden, no court or administrative tribunal had ordered
compulsory trademark licensing as a remedy in a litigated antitrust case.
II.

COMPULSORY LICENSING OF THE REALEMON AND
CEREAL TRADEMARKS

In July, 1974, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint charging
that Borden, Inc. had violated section 5 of the FTC Act by monopolizing
the marketing and sale of reconstituted lemon juice. In particular, the
complaint charged that Borden, through its unit ReaLemon Foods, had
used its dominant position in the market to impede the growth of smaller
reconstituted lemon juice manufacturers and to prevent competition in
the sale of reconstituted lemon juice. The complaint alleged that the relevant market was the marketing and sale of reconstituted lemon juice in
the United States and that Borden's ReaLemon brand accounted for approximately 80% of reconstituted lemon juice sales in 1973. In the complaint counsel's notice of contemplated relief, the FTC staff indicated that
they would seek compulsory licensing of the ReaLemon trademark to help
dissipate the monopoly. 61
After a seven week trial, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an
initial decision. He concluded that processed lemon juice was the proper
submarket for consideration of Borden's anticompetitive conduct, that Borden
possessed a monopoly position and monopoly power in that submarket, that
Borden had the purpose and intent of maintaining its monopoly power, and
that it effectuated that purpose through discriminatory pricing and promotions. 62 Under these facts, Borden was held to have violated section 5 of
63
the F.T.C. Act.
Of particular interest in the case is the relationship which the ALJ found
between the ReaLemon trademark and Borden's monopoly power in the
processed lemon juice market. In concluding that ReaLemon was the
dominant brand and was virtually a generic name for bottled lemon juice,
the ALJ relied upon Borden's own strategy documents. One of these docu61.
62.

Complaint No. 8978, at 128 (F.T.C., filed July 8, 1974).
Borden, Inc., No. 8978, at 162 (F.T.C., Aug. 19, 1976).

63.

15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
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ments stated that "[h]istorically, ReaLemon has been THE total market for
both bottled lemon and lime juices."'6 4 The ALJ noted that respondent
touted ReaLemon as "one of the greatest brand names in the history of the
supermarket."0' 5 He cited Borden's awareness that the substantial price
differential commanded by the ReaLemon brand was unusual and attributed
it to ReaLemon's premium brand image which had been created through
extensive advertising and promotion over the years." 6 He determined that
the dominance of the brand and its public acceptance were a substantial
barrier to entry in the processed lemon juice market. Relying on the testimony of an economist, the ALJ concluded that the ReaLemon trademark
was a factor in Borden's monopoly power because competitors, without the
superior brand recognition that the ReaLemon mark carried, had to compete
on the basis of price, and that ReaLemon, because of the high profitability of
the brand on a national scale, was able to withstand regional price competition more easily than its competitors. 67 The AU determined that the
ReaLemon trademark was a powerful force in the marketplace and that
Borden had engaged in activity calculated to exclude competition, but he
did not label Borden's use of its trademark to perpetuate its monopoly as
a trademark misuse. And although he commented on the near-generic
status of the ReaLemon trademark,6 8 his decision was not a judicial determination that the trademark had in fact become generic. This issue was
not litigated and it is doubtful that the Federal Trade Commission would be
the proper forum for the determination of generic status.
In fashioning a remedy, the ALU stated that relief in a monopoly case
should "put an end to the monopoly position, and break up or render impotent the monopoly power found to have been preserved and maintained
in violation of law." 09 He concluded that enjoining the acts and practices
by which Borden preserved its monopoly would not be adequate since the
heart of Borden's monopoly power was the ReaLemon trademark. Compulsory licensing of the trademark was determined to be the only effective relief.
The ALJ found precedent for compulsory trademark licensing in patent cases,
stating that "[a] requirement for compulsory licensing of a trademark . . .
is not essentially different from a requirement of compulsory licensing of a
' 70
patent."
64. Borden, Inc., No. 8978, at 52, 60 (F.T.C., Aug. 19, 1976).
65. Id. at 60.
66. Id. at 52, 60.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.

at
at
at
at

67-77.
59.
162-63.
165.
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Borden was ordered, for a period of 10 years, to license the ReaLemon
trademark to all those seeking its use at a nominal royalty of one-half of one
percent of sales under the trademark. The order provided that Borden could
require that licensees conspicuously disclose the name of the manufacturer or
distributor of the product being marketed under the ReaLemon name.
Borden was also permitted to require that licensees adhere to reasonable
quality control standards. These standards were to be administered by an
independent third party acceptable to Borden and to the licensees. Borden
was ordered to advertise the availability of licenses in three significant trade
journals once every three months for five years after the order issued. Additionally, Borden was ordered to cease granting discriminatory price reductions, selling ReaLemon below cost or at unreasonably low prices, and
granting promotional allowances which hindered, restrained, or eliminated
71
competition.
The FTC staff is also seeking compulsory trademark licensing in an action
against the major cereal manufacturers 72 in which the complaint counsel contends that the respondents have dominated the relevant market through brand
and product differentiation supported by intensive advertising. 73 To eliminate
the respondents' monopoly power, the Commission staff proposes that
Kellogg, General Mills, and General Foods be required to license for twenty
years their existing trademarks royalty-free and to provide formulas and
methods of production to any firm, other than those named as respondents,
willing to comply with quality control standards. Moreover, complaint counsel urge that, in addition to licensure of existing trademarks, the three companies be required to license all new ready-to-eat cereal trademarks on a
similar basis after five years of exclusive use. 74 The proponents of this remedy
argue that licensing of the three cereal manufacturers' trademarks will encourage price competition, discourage brand proliferation, diminish advertising for promotion of new products,75 and entice new entrants into the market
by reducing brand promotion costs.
71. Id. at 167-70. Since Borden is challenging the AJ's ruling, the order will not
become effective until the Commission itself has heard the case and renders an opinion
on the matter.
72. Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (F.T.C., filed May 4, 1972).

For an analysis of the

complaint issued against the cereal manufacturers, see Scanlon, Oligopoly and "Deceptive" Advertising: The Cereal Industry Affair, 3 ANTrrRuST L. & EcoN. REV. 99 (Spring
1970); Note, Oligopolies, Cereals and Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 61 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1973).

73. Brief, supra note 11, at 46-58.
74. Id. at 120, 128-30. Additionally, the staff proposes divestiture of the assets of
the four firms and formation of five additional firms from these assets. Id. at 122-25.
75. See note 61 supra.
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The cereal case is more radical than Borden in both legal theory and
remedy. Borden is, with the exception of the role of the ReaLemon
trademark and the remedy prescribed, a rather ordinary monopolization case in which the respondent possesses, and has actively maintained,
a disproportionately large share of the market. In contrast, the cereal
case, setting forth the untried theory of shared monopoly, challenges the
oligopolistic market structure of the cereal industry. The relief requested in
the cereal case differs from that ordered in Borden in several respects. The
cereal complaint seeks royalty-free trademark licensure, whereas Borden
ordered some compensation, albeit minimal, to the trademark owner. Similarly, compulsory licensing for a 20-year period is recommended in the cereal
complaint as opposed to the 10-year period ordered in Borden. Furthermore, in Borden the licensing of one extremely powerful trademark was required, whereas the cereal complaint seeks licensure of all ready-to-eat cereal
trademarks, existing and future, held by the three companies.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF COMPULSORY TRADEMARK LICENSING

The Borden decision and the cereal complaint indicate that the FTC
Bureau of Competition will not hesitate to argue for compulsory licensing
when it deems it an appropriate remedy for antitrust violations.78 Although
Borden is being appealed to the Federal Trade Commission itself, 7 7 the
AL's decision is a significant extension of existing law.

Borden represents

a judgment that, when a trademark, because of extensive advertising and consumer acceptance, becomes a source of monopoly power, compulsory licensing
is an appropriate means by which that monopoly power may be dissipated.78
It is the first judicial recognition that when a monopoly of a particular product
exists, a trademark which identifies the product may become a by-word with
the public; 79 thus effective relief for antitrust violations must include dislodging the power associated with that trademark. 0 This new development may
76. See also Compulsory Patent Licensing by FT7C Decree, Address by Owen M.
Johnson, Jr., Director of Bureau of Competition, FTC, Before the Licensing Executives
Society (U.S.A.), Inc., Oct. 27, 1976, at 10-11.
77. Respondent's Notice of Intent to Appeal, No. 8978 (F.T.C., filed Nov. 15, 1976).

78. Timberg, writing in 1949, urged that whether a trademark is the creature or the
cause of a monopoly, trademark relief is an effective means of dissipating monopoly
power because "the mere existence of a monopoly over the manufacture or distribution
of a product necessarily confers upon the trademark. . . [a] quality of genericness. .. .
Timberg, supra note 33, at 344.
79. Stedman, supra note 60, at 271.
80. Moreover, the determination of an AUJ that it is within the existing powers of
the FTC to order licensure of trademarks indicates that proposals for specific legislative

authority for the FTC to institute compulsory licensure, see Comment, supra note 37,
at 661-66, may be unnecessary.
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be hailed as an appropriate and beneficial means of restoring competition to
markets which are dominated by products bearing economically powerful
trademarks.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the Borden decision may be criticized.
One deficiency of Borden is that, under the prevailing interpretation of the
order, 8 ' licensing is limited to a period of 10 years, after which Borden will
again have exclusive use of the trademark, provided that it has not become
a generic word during the 10-year period. After the trademark has been
used by Borden's competition for 10 years, consumers will be even more accustomed than they are now to purchasing processed lemon juice under the
name ReaLemon. Therefore, after the period of compulsory licensing,
ReaLemon may have even greater consumer acceptance than it has now and
it will continue to be difficult for manufacturers to compete with Borden
under their own trademarks.8 2
It is conceivable that this problem will not arise. Competitors may in fact
use the Reabemon trademark only to break into the market and then, anticipating the end of compulsory licensing and utilizing their improved financial
situation, attempt to establish consumer recognition of their own trademarks
by advertising and promotion. The Commission could facilitate this process
by amending the order to require compulsory licensing for a longer period in
order that Borden's competition might have more time to make inroads into
the marketplace and begin to establish their own trademarks. Alternatively,
the Commission could order compulsory licensure until it deems it no longer
necessary: that is, until competition becomes viable without it. In the absence of such provisions, however, the order may ultimately benefit Borden
in a way presumably not intended by the ALJ.
There is always the possibility that during the ten years of compulsory
licensing the ReaLemon trademark will become a generic word. Although
the ALJ did not hold that the trademark had become generic, he recognized that it was virtually a generic term.83 During the ten-year compulsory
licensing period, "ReaLemon" might become so linked in the public's mind
with the product of processed lemon juice that it would cease to signify
processed lemon juice produced by Borden. If this occurs, Borden's exclusive
rights to the mark will be lost.8 4 To the extent that this result is likely, it
81. There is some ambiguity in the wording of the order and it has been suggested
that the ALJ may have intended that Borden grant all applicants during a 10-year period
perpetual licenses to the trademark.
82. 780 ANTrrRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Sept. 14, 1976).
83. See note 68 & accompanying text.
84. See Brief of Respondent Borden, Inc. in Support of Its Appeal from the Initial
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can be argued that Judge Hanscom's order goes beyond merely restoring competition to the marketplace. However, given the standard of proof required for a finding of generic status,8 5 it is entirely possible that the
trademark will not in fact become generic. This will depend upon the
extent to which licensees and other competitors, in the exercise of good business judgment, undertake active promotion of their own trademarks in anticipation of the end of the 10-year compulsory licensing. 86 Thus the AL's
order will not inevitably deprive Borden of its exclusive rights in the mark.
Although the trademarks involved in the cereal case are potent economic weapons, they are not near-generic in the sense of being synonomous
with ready-to-eat cereal. Thus there is less likelihood that compulsory
licensing would effectively push them over the generic line. Nevertheless,
an order compelling the three cereal manufacturers to license their trademarks would be a significant extension of the Borden decision. Borden involved a classic situation long recognized by commentators, 87 if not judges,
as appropriate for compulsory licensing; that is, a single trademark so closely
identified with all processed lemon juice that it was itself a significant source
of monopoly power. The cereal case, on the other hand, involves many
trademarks which are potent economic forces not because they are closely
linked in the public's mind with ready-to-eat cereal, but rather because their
extensive numbers and rapid proliferation are means of diverting customers
from competitive brands. If the Commission staff prevails in the cereal
case, oligopolists who engage in product differentiation and brand proliferation as a means of erecting barriers to entry will be subject to forfeiture of
trademark rights as a result of section 5 violations.
Critics of compulsory trademark licensure argue that it will create confusion because the consumer will be confronted with a whole array of
ReaLemon from which he will have to choose, 8 and that it will destroy the
function of the trademark as an indicator of source.89 While compulsory liDecision of the Administrative Law Judge, No. 8978, at 64 (F.T.C., filed Nov. 15,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Respondent].
85. See notes 20-29 &accompanying text.
86. Significant in this context is the recent introduction of Minute Maid lemon juice
and a vigorous advertising campaign to promote it. See ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 13,
1976, at 4.
87. See, e.g., Stedman, supra note 60, at 270.
88. Brief on Behalf of United States Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae, Borden, Inc., No. 8978, at 7 (F.T.C., filed Nov. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Amicus
Brief]; Brief of Respondent, supra note 84, at 57-60; Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1976, at 22,
col. 1; ADvERTIsNo AGE, Sept. 13, 1976, at 4.
89. Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 6-9; Brief of Respondent, supra note 84, at 63.
Additionally, critics urge that competitor-licensees will have no motivation to maintain
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censure may have some of these effects, regular trademark licensure, which is
now commonplace, creates similar problems. 90 Safeguards such as conspicuous identification of the manufacturer or distributor of the product"' could
lessen consumer confusion, and the provision for reasonable quality control
standards9 2 will insure that the consumer is buying a product of the quality to
which he is accustomed. It should also be remembered that compulsory trademark licensing will only be ordered when antitrust violations have occurred
and when trademark licensing is an appropriate vehicle to restore competition
to the marketplace. In this context, the injury to the consumer from a noncompetitive market must be weighed against the harm that will arise from
the offering of several products bearing the same trademark.
One final deficiency of the Borden decision is the ALJ's assertion that compulsory trademark and patent licensing are not essentially different. 93 This
facile assumption minimizes the very real differences between patents and
trademarks. 94 The potential for anticompetitive activity always inheres in a
patent, which carries exclusive rights to the technology it covers. The anticompetitive potential of a trademark, however, depends not upon the mere
existence of the trademark, but upon its link in the consumer's mind with a
certain kind of product, a connection which is usually nurtured by advertising
and promotion.9 5 Thus while a patent generally carries some economic
power, a trademark's anticompetitive potential depends upon the extent to
which its owner has attempted and succeeded, through extensive advertising
and promotion, in making the trademark a household word. Guidance for
when compulsory trademark licensing is appropriate will be obtained only
with a forthright acknowledgment of the difference between patents and
trademarks.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The acceptance of compulsory trademark licensing as a remedy for antitrust violations could in the long run drastically alter marketing in this
country. Companies which have spent fortunes attempting to foster conquality standards; this will reflect badly upon the licensor and may subject the licensor
to liability arising as a result of poor quality. Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 10-1i.
90. Contra, Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 9. See generally Comment, Quality Control and The Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
91. Borden, Inc., No. 8978, at 167 (F.T.C., Aug. 19, 1976).
92. Id. at 168.
93. Id. at 165.
94. See, e.g., Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 5-7; Brief of Respondent, supra note
84, at 60.
95. See 615 ANTrrausT & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) A-13 (May 29, 1973).
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sumer acceptance of a brand name would operate under the threat of having
to share that consumer acceptance with competitors at a minimal return.
The successfully differentiated brand could become a liability rather than an
asset to those who violate the antitrust laws. Ultimately the use of compulsory licensing may promote price competition rather than competition
through brand differentiation and help to bring the same goods to consumers
at lower prices.
Sara V. Dobb

